Thoman, Lynda Repeat purchases under quality uncertainty. (English) Zbl 0816.90048 Econ. Lett. 46, No. 1, 33-40 (1994). Summary: If the quality of a seller’s products is uncertain and a single purchase cannot reveal the seller’s expected quality, all sellers may benefit if their mean quality or type is not revealed. MSC: 91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models Keywords:expected quality PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{L. Thoman}, Econ. Lett. 46, No. 1, 33--40 (1994; Zbl 0816.90048) Full Text: DOI References: [1] McGuire, T.G., Patients’ trust and the quality of physicians, Economic inquiry, 21, no. 2, 203-222, (1983) [2] Nelson, P., Information and consumer behaviour, Journal of political economy, 78, 311-329, (1970) This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.