Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control. (English) Zbl 1274.91276 Games Econ. Behav. 77, No. 1, 41-60 (2013). Summary: Numerous gift-exchange experiments have found a positive wage/effort relationship. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. This paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage/effort relationship. We compare the standard bilateral gift-exchange game between an owner-manager and a worker with two trilateral ones where the firm is owned by a shareholder and controlled by a manager. The wage/effort relationship is similar in all three situations. Most strikingly, workers reward higher wages with higher effort, even when the manager does not share in the firm’s profits. MSC: 91B40 Labor market, contracts (MSC2010) 91A90 Experimental studies Keywords:gift exchange; reciprocity; ownership; control PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{S. Maximiano} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 77, No. 1, 41--60 (2013; Zbl 1274.91276) Full Text: DOI Link Link