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The subgame-consistent Shapley value for dynamic network games with shock. (English) Zbl 1391.91056

Summary: In the paper, cooperative repeated network games containing network formation stages are studied. After the first network formation stage, a particular player with a given probability may stop influencing other players by removing all her links and receiving zero payoffs. This effect is called “shock”. The effect of shock may appear only once, and the stage number, at which shock appears, is chosen at random. In the cooperative scenario of the game, subgame consistency of the Shapley value, based on a characteristic function, which is constructed in a special way, is investigated. To prevent players from breaking the cooperative agreement, a mechanism of stage payments – so-called imputation distribution procedure – is designed.

MSC:

91A43 Games involving graphs
91A12 Cooperative games
91A20 Multistage and repeated games
91A50 Discrete-time games
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