×

The war of attrition with incomplete information. (English) Zbl 0886.90196

Summary: We present a continuous-time model of the war of attrition with exponential discounting and with two-sided incomplete information. We provide a full characterization of the Bayesian equilibria of this game, without restricting strategies to be differentiable.

MSC:

91A55 Games of timing
91A05 2-person games
PDFBibTeX XMLCite
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Bishop, D. T.; Cannings, J.; Maynard Smith, J., The war of attrition with random rewards, J. Theoret. Biol., 74, 377-388 (1978)
[2] Bliss, C.; Nalebuff, B., Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: the private supply of a public good, J. Pub. Econom., 25, 1-12 (1984)
[3] Chatterjee, K.; Samuelson, W. F., Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information, Rev. Econom. Studies, 54, 175-192 (1987) · Zbl 0615.90098
[4] Davies, T. V.; James, E. M., Nonlinear Differential Equations (1966), Addison-Wesley · Zbl 0135.30602
[5] Fudenberg, D.; Tirole, J., A theory of exit in Duopoly, Econometrica, 54, 943-960 (1986) · Zbl 0596.90015
[6] Fudenberg, D.; Gilbert, R.; Stiglitz, J.; Tirole, J., Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races, Europ. Econom. Rev., 22, 3-31 (1983)
[7] Ghemawat, R.; Nalebuff, B., Exit, The Rand J. Econom., 16, 184-194 (1985)
[8] Hendricks, K.; Weiss, A.; Wilson, C., The war of attrition in continuous time with complete information, Int. Econom. Rev., 29, 663-680 (1988) · Zbl 0669.90098
[9] Kreps, D. M.; Wilson, R. B., Reputation and imperfect information, J. Econom. Theory, 27, 253-279 (1982) · Zbl 0485.90093
[10] Maynard Smith, J., The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts, J. Theoret. Biol., 47, 209-221 (1974)
[11] Milgrom, P.; Weber, R., Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information, Math. Op. Res., 10, 619-632 (1985) · Zbl 0582.90106
[12] Nalebuff, B.; Riley, J., Asymmetric equilibria in the war of attrition, J. Theoret. Biol., 113, 517-527 (1985)
[13] Osborne, M., The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model, (Roth, A. E., Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining (1985), Cambridge University Press: Cambridge University Press Cambridge), 181-213
[14] Ordover, J. A.; Rubinstein, A., A sequential concession game with asymmetric information, Quart. J. Econom., 101, 879-888 (1986) · Zbl 0627.90099
[15] Ponsati, C., Unique equilibrium in a model of bargaining over many issues, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 25/26, 81-100 (1992)
[16] Ponsati, C.; Sákovics, J., Mediation is necessary for efficient bargaining, (UAB-IAE W.P. 194.92 (1992), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
[17] Ponsati, C.; Sákovics, J., Multi-person bargaining over two alternatives, Games Econ. Behav. (1995), forthcoming
[18] Riley, J., Strong evolutionary equilibrium and the war of attrition, J. Theoret. Biol., 83, 383-402 (1980)
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.