zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Equilibrium solutions of an auction game related to the model of privatization of indivisible boons under conditions of corruption. (English. Russian original) Zbl 0971.91021
Dokl. Math. 59, No. 1, 154-156 (1999); translation from Dokl. Akad. Nauk, Ross. Akad. Nauk 364, No. 2, 178-180 (1999).
The authors consider a model of privatization of objects of state property by an auction, which is conducted by corrupt officials. The model and strategies are defined in the form of a game between a finite number of participants-buyers and a one bureaucrat-seller. A solution of the game is defined as an equilibrium which balance: (A) the interests of different participants in their competition for objects, and (B) the interests of the participants and the bureaucrat. Assuming a number of assumptions the authors proved that an equilibrium exists, and it is unique under additional assumptions.
Reviewer’s remark: It seems that by the authors V-th assumption a participant with lower resources has an advantage over the other participants with higher resources.

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A40 Other game-theoretic models