zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Linear-complexity private set intersection protocols secure in malicious model. (English) Zbl 1253.94044
Abe, Masayuki (ed.), Advances in cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2010. 16th international conference on the theory and application of cryptology and information security, Singapore, December 5–9, 2010. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer (ISBN 978-3-642-17372-1/pbk). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6477, 213-231 (2010).
Summary: Private set intersection (PSI) protocols allow one party (“client”) to compute an intersection of its input set with that of another party (“server”) such that the client learns nothing other than the set intersection and the server learns nothing beyond client input size. Prior work yielded a range of PSI protocols secure under different cryptographic assumptions. Protocols operating in the semi-honest model offer better (linear) complexity while those in the malicious model are often significantly more costly. In this paper, we construct PSI and authorized PSI (APSI) protocols secure in the malicious model under standard cryptographic assumptions, with both linear communication and computational complexities. To the best of our knowledge, our APSI is the first solution to do so. Finally, we show that our linear PSI is appreciably more efficient than the state of the art.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1202.94006].

94A60 Cryptography
Full Text: DOI