Grant, Simon; Kajii, Atsushi; Polak, Ben Preference for information and dynamic consistency. (English) Zbl 1028.91571 Theory Decis. 48, No. 3, 263-286 (2000). Summary: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent. Cited in 5 Documents MSC: 91B44 Economics of information 91B08 Individual preferences Keywords:information; non-expected utility; dynamic consistency; randomization; anxiety PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{S. Grant} et al., Theory Decis. 48, No. 3, 263--286 (2000; Zbl 1028.91571) Full Text: DOI