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The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction. (English) Zbl 0840.90041

Summary: The article strengthens and provides a dynamic extension of the theory on collective rent seeking and private provision of a public good. Each individual agent within each group chooses in continuous or discrete time a continuous or discrete time a continuous or discrete effort level. The combined effort within each group provides within-group public goods which are used as an input in the between-group \(n\)-group competition for an extremal prize. Intergroup mobility and intergroup warfare are allowed for. Each group and each individual agent within each group get a fraction of the prize based on a linear combination of equity and relative effort.
A model/algorithm is developed generating analytical results and simulations illustrating how the interaction within and between groups proceeds through time.

MSC:

91B18 Public goods
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
91B10 Group preferences
91B62 Economic growth models
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