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Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games. (English) Zbl 0741.90102
Summary: We show that implementation of the core of a two-person pure allocation game can be achieved without the use of ‘free disposal’, ‘integer games’, or any refinement of Nash equilibria.
MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
91B50 General equilibrium theory
91B14 Social choice
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
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[1] Dutta, B.; Sen, A., A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation, Review of economic studies, 58, 121-128, (1991) · Zbl 0717.90005
[2] Jackson, M.; Palfrey, T., Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms, Paper presented to the harvard economic theory workshop, (1990)
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[4] Sjöström, T., Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games, Paper presented to the harvard economic theory workshop, (1990) · Zbl 0801.90008
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