Grant, Simon; King, Stephen; Peterson, Steven; Polak, Ben Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games. (English) Zbl 0741.90102 Econ. Lett. 37, No. 3, 223-227 (1991). Summary: We show that implementation of the core of a two-person pure allocation game can be achieved without the use of ‘free disposal’, ‘integer games’, or any refinement of Nash equilibria. MSC: 91A12 Cooperative games 91B50 General equilibrium theory 91B14 Social choice 91A40 Other game-theoretic models Keywords:core; two-person pure allocation game; Nash equilibria PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{S. Grant} et al., Econ. Lett. 37, No. 3, 223--227 (1991; Zbl 0741.90102) Full Text: DOI References: [1] Dutta, B.; Sen, A., A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation, Review of economic studies, 58, 121-128, (1991) · Zbl 0717.90005 [2] Jackson, M.; Palfrey, T., Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms, Paper presented to the harvard economic theory workshop, (1990) [3] Moore, J.; Repullo, R., Nash implementation: A full characterization, Econometrica, 58, 1083-1099, (1990) · Zbl 0731.90009 [4] Sjöström, T., Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games, Paper presented to the harvard economic theory workshop, (1990) · Zbl 0801.90008 This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.