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Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games. (English) Zbl 0632.90098
Summary: Under weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff vector of a one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a Nash equilibrium of a finitely repeated game with a long enough horizon.

MSC:
91A20 Multistage and repeated games
91A05 2-person games
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References:
[1] Benoit J-P, Krishna V (1985) Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53:905–922 · Zbl 0588.90095 · doi:10.2307/1912660
[2] Friedman J (1985) Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon non-cooperative supergames. Journal of Economic Theory 35:390–398 · Zbl 0585.90104 · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90051-1
[3] Luce R, Raiffa H (1957) Games and decisions. Wiley, New York · Zbl 0084.15704
[4] Sorin S (1983) On repeated games with complete information. Manuscript Mathematics of Operations Research (forthcoming) · Zbl 0526.90106
[5] Van-Damme E (1983) Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Springer, Berlin · Zbl 0523.90095
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