Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan Apparent bias: what does attitude polarization show? (English) Zbl 1431.91133 Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 4, 1675-1703 (2019). MSC: 91B08 91-05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{J. Dubra}, Int. Econ. Rev. 60, No. 4, 1675--1703 (2019; Zbl 1431.91133) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan On the problem of prevention. (English) Zbl 1420.91125 Int. Econ. Rev. 54, No. 3, 787-805 (2013). MSC: 91B30 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{J. Dubra}, Int. Econ. Rev. 54, No. 3, 787--805 (2013; Zbl 1420.91125) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan Apparent overconfidence. (English) Zbl 1271.91093 Econometrica 79, No. 5, 1591-1625 (2011). MSC: 91E10 62P25 62-07 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{J. Dubra}, Econometrica 79, No. 5, 1591--1625 (2011; Zbl 1271.91093) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Kornhauser, Lewis A. Only a dictatorship is efficient. (English) Zbl 1200.91271 Games Econ. Behav. 70, No. 2, 261-270 (2010). MSC: 91F10 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{L. A. Kornhauser}, Games Econ. Behav. 70, No. 2, 261--270 (2010; Zbl 1200.91271) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A. Nash implementation without no-veto power. (English) Zbl 1153.91394 Games Econ. Behav. 64, No. 1, 51-67 (2008). MSC: 91B14 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{E. A. Ok}, Games Econ. Behav. 64, No. 1, 51--67 (2008; Zbl 1153.91394) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean Pierre; Ok, Efe A.; Sanver, M. Remzi On combining implementable social choice rules. (English) Zbl 1155.91344 Games Econ. Behav. 60, No. 1, 20-30 (2007). MSC: 91B14 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. P. Benoît} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 60, No. 1, 20--30 (2007; Zbl 1155.91344) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan Information revelation in auctions. (English) Zbl 1153.91434 Games Econ. Behav. 57, No. 2, 181-205 (2006). MSC: 91B26 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{J. Dubra}, Games Econ. Behav. 57, No. 2, 181--205 (2006; Zbl 1153.91434) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A. Maskin’s theorem with limited veto power. (English) Zbl 1125.91010 Games Econ. Behav. 55, No. 2, 331-339 (2006). MSC: 91A12 91B14 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{E. A. Ok}, Games Econ. Behav. 55, No. 2, 331--339 (2006; Zbl 1125.91010) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted. (English) Zbl 1127.91327 J. Econ. Theory 102, No. 2, 421-436 (2002). MSC: 91B14 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît}, J. Econ. Theory 102, No. 2, 421--436 (2002; Zbl 1127.91327) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Krishna, Vijay Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders. (English) Zbl 1114.91314 Rev. Econ. Stud. 68, No. 1, 155-179 (2001). MSC: 91B26 91B28 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{V. Krishna}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 68, No. 1, 155--179 (2001; Zbl 1114.91314) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, J.-P. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof. (English) Zbl 0956.91064 Econ. Lett. 69, No. 3, 319-322 (2000). MSC: 91B82 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. P. Benoît}, Econ. Lett. 69, No. 3, 319--322 (2000; Zbl 0956.91064) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Kornhauser, Lewis A. On the separability of assembly preferences. (English) Zbl 1066.91511 Soc. Choice Welfare 16, No. 3, 429-439 (1999). MSC: 91B10 91B12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{L. A. Kornhauser}, Soc. Choice Welfare 16, No. 3, 429--439 (1999; Zbl 1066.91511) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre The nucleolus is contested-garment-consistent: A direct proof. (English) Zbl 0892.90187 J. Econ. Theory 77, No. 1, 192-196 (1997). MSC: 91A12 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît}, J. Econ. Theory 77, No. 1, 192--196 (1997; Zbl 0892.90187) Full Text: DOI
Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Krishna, Vijay Renegotiation in finitely repeated games. (English) Zbl 0799.90135 Econometrica 61, No. 2, 303-323 (1993). MSC: 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{V. Krishna}, Econometrica 61, No. 2, 303--323 (1993; Zbl 0799.90135) Full Text: DOI
Benoit, Jean-Pierre A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma. (English) Zbl 0654.90108 Math. Soc. Sci. 16, No. 3, 281-287 (1988). MSC: 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoit}, Math. Soc. Sci. 16, No. 3, 281--287 (1988; Zbl 0654.90108) Full Text: DOI
Benoit, J.-P.; Krishna, V. Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games. (English) Zbl 0632.90098 Int. J. Game Theory 16, 197-204 (1987). MSC: 91A20 91A05 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. P. Benoit} and \textit{V. Krishna}, Int. J. Game Theory 16, 197--204 (1987; Zbl 0632.90098) Full Text: DOI
Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Krishna, Vijay Dynamic duopoly: prices and quantities. (English) Zbl 0612.90010 Rev. Econ. Stud. 54, 23-35 (1987). Reviewer: S.Honkapohja MSC: 91B54 91A40 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoit} and \textit{V. Krishna}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 54, 23--35 (1987; Zbl 0612.90010) Full Text: DOI
Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Krishna, Vijay Finitely repeated games. (English) Zbl 0588.90095 Econometrica 53, 905-922 (1985). Reviewer: S.Tijs MSC: 91A10 91A20 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoit} and \textit{V. Krishna}, Econometrica 53, 905--922 (1985; Zbl 0588.90095) Full Text: DOI
Benoit, Jean-Pierre Innovation and imitation in a duopoly. (English) Zbl 0547.90012 Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 99-106 (1985). MSC: 91B24 PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoit}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 99--106 (1985; Zbl 0547.90012) Full Text: DOI