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Only a dictatorship is efficient. (English) Zbl 1200.91271
Summary: In many, if not most, elections, several different seats must be filled, so that a group of candidates, or an assembly, is selected. Typically in these elections, voters cast their ballots on a seat-by-seat basis. We show that these seat-by-seat procedures are efficient only under extreme conditions.

91F10 History, political science
91B12 Voting theory
Full Text: DOI
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