Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Kornhauser, Lewis A. On the separability of assembly preferences. (English) Zbl 1066.91511 Soc. Choice Welfare 16, No. 3, 429-439 (1999). Summary: Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. This candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over assemblies are separable. We show, however, that if preferences over assemblies are themselves derived from underlying preferences over legislative or economic outcomes, then preferences over assemblies will not in general be separable. Cited in 3 Documents MSC: 91B10 Group preferences 91B12 Voting theory PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J.-P. Benoît} and \textit{L. A. Kornhauser}, Soc. Choice Welfare 16, No. 3, 429--439 (1999; Zbl 1066.91511) Full Text: DOI