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Stationary frequencies and mixing times for neutral drift processes with spatial structure. (English) Zbl 1407.92095
Summary: We study a general setting of neutral evolution in which the population is of finite, constant size and can have spatial structure. Mutation leads to different genetic types (traits), which can be discrete or continuous. Under minimal assumptions, we show that the marginal trait distributions of the evolutionary process, which specify the probability that any given individual has a certain trait, all converge to the stationary distribution of the mutation process. In particular, the stationary frequencies of traits in the population are independent of its size, spatial structure and evolutionary update rule, and these frequencies can be calculated by evaluating a simple stochastic process describing a population of size one (i.e. the mutation process itself). We conclude by analysing mixing times, which characterize rates of convergence of the mutation process along the lineages, in terms of demographic variables of the evolutionary process.

MSC:
92D15 Problems related to evolution
92D25 Population dynamics (general)
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